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EXECUTIVE ORDERS AS LAWFUL LIMITS ON
AGENCY POLICYMAKING DISCRETION
Adam J. White*
INTRODUCTION
Agencies are bound generally by the Administrative Procedure Act’s
rulemaking requirements, but Presidents emphatically are not.1 That dichotomy presents an interesting question: If a President orders an agency to
adopt a specific policy in a rulemaking, and if his chosen policy fits within the
broader limits of discretion that Congress conferred upon the agency in its
substantive statute, then to what extent does the APA still obligate the agency
to respond to criticism of the President’s chosen policy in the notice-andcomment rulemaking process?
In the D.C. Circuit, at least, the answer is simple: if the President orders
an executive agency to take action within the lawful limits of the agency’s
substantive statute and the agency implements that policy choice through a
rulemaking, then the agency is not required to respond to public comments
challenging the merits of the President’s policy choice.2
In this Article, I consider principles and trends that preceded—and, I
think, justify—this doctrinal development, rightly understood. After briefly
retracing previous Presidents’ general uses of executive orders and debates
over presidential power more generally, culminating with the late twentiethcentury executive orders on White House regulatory oversight, I review the
case of Sherley v. Sebelius, in which the D.C. Circuit held that when an agency
receives an executive order lawfully cabining or directing the its regulatory
discretion, it is excused from its otherwise general duty to respond to
rulemaking comments challenging its policy choice.3 Then, examining this
general duty of agencies to respond to rulemaking comments, I consider
© 2018 Adam J. White. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Research Fellow, Stanford University’s Hoover Institution; Executive Director, The
Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason University’s Antonin
Scalia Law School. Email: ajwhite@stanford.edu.
1 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 468 (1994) (“We concluded . . . that the APA does
not apply to the President.”); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
2 Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784–85 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
3 Id.
1569
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whether the D.C. Circuit’s approach comports with the values and purposes
underlying that duty.
This is a question of more than merely theoretical or scholarly interest.
Recent Presidents have proven increasingly willing to use executive orders to
drive substantive rulemakings, most recently on issues such as financial policy,4 energy policy,5 infrastructure development,6 and land-use policy.7 If
Presidents continue that trend by including more specific policy directives in
executive orders, then substantial policy questions increasingly will be implemented by agencies at the President’s direction—thus reducing, at least in
part, the range of issues subjected to the ordinary notice-and-comment
process.
Which is to say, executive orders may become a prominent presidential
“trump card” in the rulemaking process, a logical extension of decades of
increasing presidential responsibility for the modern administrative state.
I. EXECUTIVE ORDERS

AND

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

A. Executive Orders: Ascertained by Substance, Not Form
Although presidential action has been a central feature of American governance from the start (as recounted very briefly in Section II.B, below) and
studied at untold length, “executive orders” are a form of presidential directive that lacks a formal legal definition. Neither Congress, nor the President,
nor the Supreme Court has attempted to clearly define and demarcate them.
Even the 1948 executive order expressly focused on the “preparation, presentation, filing, and publication of Executive orders and proclamations” did not
attempt to define “executive order.”8
In the most general sense, an executive order is a presidential directive
that binds executive branch officials and sometimes also binds the public
with the force of law.9 As the Supreme Court explained in The Steel Seizure
Case, an executive order lawfully binds the public when it “stem[s] either
4 Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017) (“Core Principles for
Regulating the United States Financial System”).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (“Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth”).
6 Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 24, 2017) (“Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects”).
7 Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017) (“Restoring the Rule of
Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’
Rule”).
8 See Exec. Order No. 10,006, 13 Fed. Reg. 5927 (Oct. 12, 1948) (“Preparation, Presentation, Filing, and Publication of Executive Orders and Proclamations”), cited in H.
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A
STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 n.1 (1957), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=mdp.39015034716152;view=1up;seq=3 [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY].
9 See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 597 (2005).
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from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”10 More recently, in
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court suggested that executive orders might
even obtain the force of law based on Congress’s tacit acquiescence.11
Thus, executive orders are best ascertained by their substance, not their
form. As a seminal study published by the U.S. House Committee on Government Operations observed in 1957:
Executive orders and proclamations are directives or actions by the
President. When they are founded on the authority of the President derived
from the Constitution or statute, they may have the force and effect of law.
There is no law or even Executive order which attempts to define the
terms “Executive order” or “proclamation.” In the narrower sense Executive
orders and proclamations are written documents denominated as such. . . .
Executive orders are generally directed to, and govern actions by, Government officials and agencies. They usually affect private individuals only
indirectly. . . .
Since the President has no power or authority over individual citizens
and their rights except where he is granted such power and authority by a
provision in the Constitution or by statute, the President’s proclamations are
not legally binding and are at best hortatory unless based on such grants of
authority.12

The difficulty in drawing bright lines between “executive orders” and
other presidential documents owes to the fact that a document’s form does
not define its substantive effect and vice versa. The Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) explained this in a 2000 opinion: “As this Office has consistently
advised, it is our opinion that there is no substantive difference in the legal
effectiveness of an executive order and a presidential directive that is [not]
styled . . . as an executive order.”13
“We are aware of no basis for drawing a distinction as to the legal effectiveness of a presidential action based on the form or caption of the written
document through which that action is conveyed,” OLC further explained.
It added, “[i]t has been our consistent view that it is the substance of a presidential determination or directive that is controlling and not whether the
10 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); see also Ass’n for
Women in Sci. v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that an executive
order had “a distinct statutory foundation,” and thus was “to be accorded the force and
effect of a statute”).
11 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680–81 (1981); see also United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 475 (1915) (holding that Congress implicitly granted power
to the President by acquiescence, because Congress had not expressly objected to “a multitude of orders extending over a long period of time and affecting vast bodies of land”).
12 HOUSE STUDY, supra note 8, at 1. In the subsequent six decades, this House report
has been cited repeatedly on this point. See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS20846, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 1
(2014); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in ModernDay America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 6 (2002); Stack, supra note 9, at 547 n.19.
13 Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order,
24 Op. O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000).
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document is styled in a particular manner. This principle plainly extends to
the legal effectiveness of a document styled as a ‘presidential directive.’ ”14
The federal government’s modern approach to publishing and numbering executive orders dates only to 1907, when scattered executive orders
issued by previous Presidents were retroactively numbered. The numbering
project was nonexhaustive. Indeed, through the nation’s first century Presidents often issued executive orders that did not identify themselves as such;
thus, when the House committee produced its 1957 study of executive
orders, it cited not just clear examples of executive “orders” but also informal
notes signed by the President that “might be construed as Executive
orders.”15 Even after 1907, executive orders were such a “haphazard operation both as to form and procedure”16 that Erwin Griswold took to the pages
of the Harvard Law Review to complain that executive orders tended to be
“printed on a single sheet of paper, fragile and easily lost.”17 “And yet,” he
added, “these ephemera have the ‘force and effect of law.’ ”18 A year later,
Congress passed the Federal Register Act, providing for the publication of
executive orders and rulemakings,19 and in 1936 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 7298, which standardized the process for
publishing executive orders—but, as usual, did not attempt to define the
term “executive order.”20
Thus, for purposes of this Article, “executive order” refers to presidential
orders or directives that are intended to bind executive officers or the public
at large with the force of law, in terms of substance rather than form.
B. Executive Orders as a Means of Administration: Energy in the Executive, from
the Start
Alexander Hamilton’s argument for “energy in the executive” is well
known—but perhaps is still not known well enough. For while Federalist 70’s
argument for executive power is remembered primarily in terms of foreign
policy and national defense,21 Hamilton took care to stress that “[e]nergy in
14
15
16

Id.
HOUSE STUDY, supra note 8, at 35 (emphasis added).
William D. Neighbors, Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U.
COLO. L. REV. 105, 107 (1964).
17 Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of
Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 204 (1934).
18 Id. at 205; cf. 24 Op. O.L.C. at 29 (citing an FDR-era DOJ memo “concluding that a
letter from President Roosevelt stating the government’s policy ‘constitute[d] a Presidential directive having the force and effect of law,’ notwithstanding its informality of form”
(alteration in original)).
19 Neighbors, supra note 16, at 107.
20 Exec. Order No. 7298, 1 Fed. Reg. 2284 (Feb. 18, 1936).
21 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the
necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are
essential in these domains.”).
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the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government” in
domestic governance, too:
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is
not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. . . .
A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed,
whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.22

In that way, executive orders can be a means toward the Hamiltonian
goal of good government, a transmission belt by which the President’s energy
is conveyed to executive-branch officials administering the laws on the President’s behalf and under his general oversight.23
This theory was inspired by the young nation’s recent experience with
government lacking true executive power,24 by the experience of the preConstitution states,25 and even by some of the conduct of King George III in
the prerevolutionary era,26 and the theory was put into practice from the
start by President Washington. In June 1789, just three months into his first
term in office, President Washington sent letters to the then-acting Secretaries of War and of the Treasury, and the Postmaster General and the Board of
Treasury (who were held over from the prior government pending appointment of officers under the new Constitution), asking them to report back “a
full, precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the United States.”27

22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(emphasis added).
23 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (“The vesting of the executive power
in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President
alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of
subordinates. This view has since been repeatedly affirmed by this Court.”).
24 See, e.g., LLOYD MILTON SHORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35–77 (1923); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION
OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789, at 45–64 (1923).
25 See, e.g., FEDERALIST NOS. 69, 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
26 It is important to recall that the Declaration of Independence’s list of grievances
against King George III begins not with criticisms of his heavy-handedness, but rather with
criticisms of his failure to see that laws were enacted or enforced. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (“He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of
immediate and pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his Assent
should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.”).
27 See Letter from President George Washington, to John Jay, Acting Sec’y for Foreign
Affairs (June 8, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 343, 344 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (emphasis omitted), quoted in Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of
Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 273–74 (2001).
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One New Deal Era study identifies this as the first executive order.28
That same study identifies the second executive order as Washington’s 1789
directive to territorial officials, ordering them to take measures necessary to
ascertain the intentions of certain Indian tribes and authorizing them to call
up the militia from Virginia and Pennsylvania as necessary; as to the latter
point, Washington noted that he was transmitting a copy of that order to the
two states’ governors, “so that there may not be any obstructions to such measures as shall be necessary to be taken by you.”29 Similarly, President Washington’s 1793 proclamation of neutrality among Great Britain and France
ordered officers to prosecute in federal courts any violations of the law of
nations.30
At risk of understatement, the role of Presidents in managing domestic
policy did not end with the first generation of Presidents; indeed, Marbury v.
Madison arose from President Jefferson’s order to Secretary of State Madison,
directing him not to deliver the commission to Mr. Marbury.31 As Hamilton
expected, presidential power became not merely a tool of foreign policy and
national defense, nor was its use in domestic policy limited to major policy
matters.
And as Leonard White recounts in his multivolume study of early American governance, antebellum Presidents such as James Polk were “condemned” by “law and practice . . . to be in fact the ‘city managers’ of the
federal government, although no present city manager in a large town would
28 LIST AND INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 1 (Clifford L. Lord ed., 1979).
But on its face, Washington’s letter arguably stops short of “ordering” anything; he seemingly tempered his request in light of the fact that the government was not yet fully established: “Although in the present unsettled state of the Executive Departments, under the
government of the Union, I do not conceive it expedient to call upon you for information
officially; yet I have supposed that some informal communications from the Office of foreign Affairs might neither be improper or unprofitable.” 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 27, at 343.
29 LIST AND INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS, supra note 28, at 1; Letter from
President Washington, to Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the W. Territory (Oct. 6, 1789), in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 96–97 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke
eds., 1832).
30 President George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/neutra93.asp (“And I do hereby also make known, that
whatsoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or
forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against
any of the said Powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed
contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United
States, against such punishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instructions to
those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of
nations, with respect to the Powers at war, or any of them.”). This proclamation has been
cited by several studies as an early executive order. See, e.g., Gaziano, supra note 27, at 275.
31 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 144 (1803) (reporting that Marbury’s counsel conceded that Madison, in performing nonministerial duties, was “bound to
obey [the President’s] orders, and accountable to him for his conduct”); see also Neighbors, supra note 16, at 109.
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bother with the detail that Presidents handled.”32 The nation’s business
expanded quickly but “better technical means of disposing of it . . . were slow
to emerge,” so that Presidents “manfully read reports, held conferences, studied individual cases, gave directions, and signed a staggering number of
documents.”33
Nor were Presidents’ orders limited to matters of internal executivebranch operation. As the aforementioned 1957 House Committee staff
report observes, the “first administrations used Executive orders for such purposes as the withdrawal of public lands for Indian use, for military and naval
functions, and for the erection of lighthouses, as well as for the establishment, transfer, and abolition of land districts and land offices and supplementing of acts of Congress.”34
And for still more purposes: President Lincoln famously used executive
orders not just in war zones but also in domestic Union territory, such as by
ordering General Scott to monitor the fraught situation in Annapolis and,
“in the extremest necessity, [suspend] the writ of habeas corpus.”35 Months
later, he signed an executive order authorizing General Scott to suspend the
writ “between the city of New York and the city of Washington.”36 After the
war, President Andrew Johnson used an executive order to declare that any
Virginians attempting to continue the Confederate government within the
state “shall be deemed and taken as in rebellion against the United States,
and shall be dealt with accordingly.”37 In that same order, Johnson
announced directives, broadly, for various federal departments—among
others, that the “Secretary of the Interior will also put in force the laws relating to the Department of the Interior.”38
The trend of direct presidential involvement and decisionmaking in
domestic policy continued well after the Civil War. As Leonard White writes,
“Cabinet meetings were regularly scheduled and most, if not all, major questions of policy, tactics, and administration came up for discussion, as well as
the perennial problems of patronage.” Presidents also met often with individual cabinet secretaries one-on-one, to privately resolve issues specific to
the given department.39
Executive orders during and after Reconstruction, too, had significant
impact on the rights of third parties. In 1876, for example, President Grant
issued an executive order prohibiting the sale of ammunition in Indian coun32 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 70 (1954).
33 Id. at 69.
34 HOUSE STUDY, supra note 8, at 35.
35 President Lincoln, Executive Order (Apr. 25, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKS, at 38 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894).
36 President Lincoln, Executive Order (July 2, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 35, at 54.
37 President Johnson, Executive Order (May 9, 1865), in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 337 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
38 Id. at 38.
39 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA 100–01 (1958).
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try, pursuant to a joint resolution by Congress that had authorized him to
take such action.40 In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a “proclamation” to set aside public lands in Wyoming as the “Devils Tower National
Monument,” pursuant to the Antiquities Act, thus preventing their
development.41
Thus, by 1907, when the State Department began to retroactively identify and assign numbers to prior executive orders (beginning with President
Lincoln’s 1862 order establishing a provincial court in Louisiana),42 the
nation had more than a century’s experience in presidential exercises of
power akin to modern “executive orders.” And in the years immediately following, executive orders took on still greater domestic regulatory weight. In
World War I, the 1957 House study explained, “Executive orders set up agencies like the War Trade Board, the Grain Corporation, the Committee on
Public Information, and the Food Administration”; and in the early 1930s,
“the . . . heyday of the Executive order,” Presidents’ orders were the means by
which “codes of fair competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act
were approved, the bank holiday was ended, and much of the administrative
organization for farm loans and agricultural relief [was] set up.”43
Executive orders reached a “heyday” in the early New Deal precisely
because their modern growth and use tracked the larger modern debate over
presidential power. FDR issued far more executive orders (3721) than any
other president; even when the numbers are figured in terms of executive
orders per year, FDR’s annualized output (307) still far outpaces his closest
competitor, President Hoover (242).44 As Tara Branum observes, FDR’s use
of executive orders reflected his fundamental view, expressed in his first inaugural address,45 that the nation’s condition “may call for temporary depar40 President Grant, Executive Order (Nov. 23, 1876), in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 1879, at 72 (1879).
41 Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906).
42 See HOUSE STUDY, supra note 8, at 37; Branum, supra note 12, at 8; see also Burke v.
Miltenberger, 86 U.S. 519, 519–20 (1873).
43 HOUSE STUDY, supra note 8, at 36.
44 Tallies for each President’s executive orders are collected and published by the
American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Gerhard
Peters & John T. Woolley, Executive Orders, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last updated Mar. 20, 2018). But its figures
cannot be taken as definitive, given the looseness with which the government long categorized and tracked them. See id. Other scholars have tallied them differently. See, e.g.,
Branum, supra note 12, at 28 (explaining that FDR “used his executive authority to issue
3723 executive orders, more than twice as many as Woodrow Wilson had issued during
World War I” (citing WILLIAM J. OLSON & ALAN WOLL, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 358,
EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: HOW PRESIDENTS HAVE COME TO “RUN THE
COUNTRY” BY USURPING LEGISLATIVE POWER 13 (1999))); Robert V. Percival, Essay, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 982
(2001) (citing JOHN CONTRUBIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R95-772, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS 26 (1999)) (ascribing 3728 executive orders to FDR).
45 Branum, supra note 12, at 28.
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ture from that normal balance of public procedure” among the executive
and legislative branches, and that he would not hesitate to “ask the Congress
for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power
to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be
given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”46
FDR was building upon the work of at least two recent similarly minded
predecessors. Two decades earlier, Teddy Roosevelt (TR) issued over 1000
executive orders during his seven-year presidency,47 consistent with his “stewardship” theory of presidential power.48 He added that:
[I]t was not only [a president’s] right but his duty to do anything that the
needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I did
and caused to be done many things not previously done by the President
and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly
broaden the use of executive power.49

TR was particularly energetic in using executive orders to advance his
broader domestic policy of national conservation, such as in his aforementioned Devils Tower order.50
By the same token, President Wilson’s still greater use of executive
orders—issuing 1803 of them in his eight-year presidency51—comported
with his own preference for executive energy over legislative deliberation,
having written years earlier that the President “is the only national voice in
affairs,” who, with the support of the people, is an “irresistible” political
force, because the nation’s “instinct is for unified action, and it craves a single leader.”52
46 First Inaugural Address of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (Bicentennial ed. 1989).
47 According, again, to the American Presidency Project at the University of California,
Santa Barbara. Peters & Woolley, supra note 44.
48 See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1913); see also id. (“The most
important factor in getting the right spirit in my Administration, next to the insistence
upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was
my insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its
Constitutional powers. . . . I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary
for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific
authorization to do it.”).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Executive Orders and Presidential Commands: Presidents
Riding to the Rescue of the Environment, 21 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 13, 21–23 (2001);
Lorraine Boissoneault, The Debate over Executive Orders Began with Teddy Roosevelt’s Mad Passion for Conservation, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.smithsonianmag.
com/history/how-theodore-roosevelts-executive-orders-reshaped-countryand-presidency180962908/#HeKpIbPfIqjqPLSL.99.
51 According, once again, to the American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Peters & Woolley, supra note 44.
52 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1908).
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But FDR’s embrace of executive orders in the management of domestic
policy also echoed and built upon the Supreme Court’s defense of presidential management of public administration in Myers v. United States.53 The
Court, led by the Chief Justice more directly familiar with the presidency
than any other, characterized executive branch officers as nothing less than
the President’s “alter ego,” their actions reflecting not their own discretion,
but his:
Made responsible under the Constitution for the effective enforcement of
the law, the President needs as an indispensable aid to meet it the disciplinary influence upon those who act under him of a reserve power of
removal. . . . The degree of guidance in the discharge of their duties that the
President may exercise over executive officers varies with the character of
their service as prescribed in the law under which they act. The highest and
most important duties which his subordinates perform are those in which they act for
him. In such cases they are exercising not their own but his discretion. This field is a
very large one. It is sometimes described as political. Each head of a department is and must be the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.54

And the Court did not limit this category to major issues of policy, or
matters expressly reserved by statute to presidential control. Rather:
The duties which are thus imposed upon him he is further enabled to
perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and the creation by Acts of
Congress, of executive departments, which have varied in number from four
or five to seven or eight, the heads of which are familiarly called cabinet
ministers. These aid him in the performance of the great duties of his office
and represent him in a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal attention is called, and thus he is enabled to fulfill the duty of his great
department, expressed in the phrase that “he shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”
In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the President
in determining the national public interest and in directing the action to be
taken by his executive subordinates to protect it. In this field his cabinet
officers must do his will. He must place in each member of his official family, and his chief executive subordinates, implicit faith. . . .
The duties of the heads of departments and bureaus in which the discretion of the President is exercised and which we have described, are the most
important in the whole field of executive action of the Government.55

Thus, even though a President surely lacks the practical resources and capacity to actually oversee all policymaking by his agencies,56 the Court’s unani53 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
54 Id. at 132–33 (1926) (first emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55 Id. at 133–34 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 49 (2012) (“In
reality, these broad delegations of authority were delegations to other administrators who
would be accountable to the President—to the extent that he had the time and resources
to supervise them.”).
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mous opinion in Myers recognized the need to preserve the President’s option
to manage and intervene as necessary.
This view of the President, as chief of the administrative departments,
did not originate with Myers,57 but Myers energized proponents of this doctrine—especially the subsequent Roosevelt administration. This was exemplified, famously, by the administration’s argument in Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States that Congress lacked constitutional power to impose statutory
limitations on the President’s power to remove at-will an FTC commissioner,
because such limits would be a “substantial interference with the constitutional duty of the President to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ ”58 That is, execution of federal statutes, especially “in the case of
those officers entrusted with the task of enforcing new legislation, such as the
Securities Act of 1933, which embodies new concepts of Federal regulation in
the public interest,” requires officers to vindicate “the purposes and policy of
the law”—as determined by the judgment of the President.59
The FDR administration’s arguments failed to convince any Justices,60
but its characterization of all agency action as effectively executive policymaking, needing Presidential oversight,61 prevailed in the long run. Less than
two years after his administration’s arguments for presidential control of
independent agencies were rejected in Humphrey’s Executor, President
Roosevelt urged to Congress, in his letter accompanying the Brownlow Committee Report, that “[t]he plain fact is that the present organization and
equipment of the executive branch of the Government defeats the constitutional intent that there be a single responsible Chief Executive to coordinate
and manage the departments and activities in accordance with the laws
enacted by the Congress,” and he called on Congress to restructure the agencies to make them more directly controllable by the President.62 Within two
generations, FDR’s argument in that letter, and in Humphrey’s Executor, would
be the intellectual zeitgeist for regulatory oversight among Democrats and
Republicans alike, informing the development of Chevron and modern
administrative law doctrines.63
57 Three years before the Myers case, for example, a study of federal administrative
power observed “the fact that the President is now generally looked upon by all political
parties, by administrative officers, by the public, and even by Congress itself, as the head of
the administration.” SHORT, supra note 24, at 23.
58 Brief for the United States at 23, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (No. 667), 1935 WL 32965, at *23.
59 Id.
60 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632 (ruling unanimously against FDR).
61 See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 58, at *24–26.
62 PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT iv (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT].
63 I trace this evolution of conservative legal thought, which I call “Rooseveltian Means
to Reaganite Ends,” in my contribution to a recent book on the “imperial presidency.”
Adam J. White, The Administrative State and the Imperial Presidency: Then and Now, in THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (Gary J. Schmitt et al. eds., 2017); see also
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C. Executive Power and the Modern Administrative Process
While Myers and Humphrey’s Executor were being litigated to determine
the nature of the presidential power to remove federal officials, a broader
conversation—or argument—was underway among policymakers, politicians,
and scholars regarding the process of federal administration.64 And in those
years-long deliberations, the power of the President to direct the agencies’
rulemaking process did not go undiscussed.
The Brownlow Committee’s report on administrative management, for
example, included an entire section focused on the relationship between the
President and the rulemaking process.65 In that section, author James Hart
traced the Constitution’s vesting of “the executive power” in the President,
and Hamilton’s arguments for executive power, forward to the burgeoning
administrative state, and concluded that the President had (and must have)
outright “power of direction” over agencies’ rulemaking activities. Indeed,
Hart argued that even when statutes are written to delegate power to the
agency per se, rather than to the President, Congress “necessarily does so on
the condition that the President is in a position to instruct them as to how
this discretion shall be exercised.”66 And when the President chooses to
direct an agency’s rulemaking activities, Hart explained, “he may . . . do this
in conversation, by letter, or by Executive order.”67
But when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
1946, it included no specific provision for presidential control of the
rulemaking process. And the APA’s legislative history was silent on the
subject.68
In the absence of a express provision for or against presidential management of the rulemaking process, Presidents began to claim greater systematic
authority. President Nixon is often credited with beginning this trend, by his
White House’s oversight of EPA rulemakings and its establishment of “Quality of Life Review,” a process by which agencies were required to provide the
White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with their proposed and final rules, along with economic analyses of their rules, to be circuThe Federal Way, 10 NAT’L REV. 9 (William F. Buckley, Jr. ed., 1961) (applauding James
Landis’s criticism of independent commissions, but criticizing Landis’s proposal to replace
those independent commissions with executive agencies as a “nasty shock” that “runs
directly counter to the original intent of Congress,” and which mirrors FDR’s failed
attempt to remove FTC Commissioner Humphrey).
64 See, e.g., George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
65 BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 62, at 329–34.
66 Id. at 331.
67 Id.
68 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706 (2012); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (1947) (not mentioning whether the President claims directive power over the
rulemaking process).
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lated among other agencies for review.69 To Nixon’s basic framework for
centralized interagency review, President Ford added a requirement that all
agencies submit their proposed rules and their evaluation of the rules’ likely
inflationary impact to the White House’s Council on Wage and Price
Stability.70
When President Carter succeeded President Ford, the change of political party controlling the White House did not break the burgeoning trend of
agency oversight; rather, Carter issued an executive order requiring all executive agencies to publish a semiannual regulatory agenda; to precede significant new regulations with a review of alternative approaches; to consider
significant new regulations’ “direct and indirect effects,” as well as their likely
reporting burdens; and to prepare a full regulatory analysis of all “major”
rules that were likely to cost $100 million annually or that were likely to have
major impacts on costs or prices.71 President Carter also established the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, an interagency body chaired by the Council
of Economic Advisers, to review the costs of a small sample of major rules
each year, and he also created the Regulatory Council, another interagency
body intended to “help ensure that regulations are well coordinated, do not
conflict, and do not impose excess burdens on particular sectors of the
economy.”72
Pildes and Sunstein suggest that the review group actually “reviewed relatively few rules, though the President did resolve a few highly controversial
issues.”73 Similarly, Justice Kagan reports (though again without citation)
that “all parties understood final decisionmaking authority to rest with the
initiating agency.”74 But this might understate the significance of the Carter
White House’s interventions. Paul Verkuil’s contemporaneous study of the
White House’s intervention in three significant rulemakings—the Labor
Department’s “Cotton Dust” rule, an EPA rule for ozone, and an Interior
Department rule on strip mining—reported that the new intervention “pro69 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2276
(2001); Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1986); Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative
Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 46–47 (2011); see also Andrew Rudalevige, Regulation Beyond Structure and
Process, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2018, at 93 (tracing the history of OMB/OIRA oversight).
70 Exec. Order. No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1975); Kagan, supra note 69, at 2276; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14
(1995).
71 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
72 Richard A. Merrill, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 58 TEX. L. REV. 463, 466 n.12
(1980) (reviewing MARSHALL S. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS (1979)) (quoting Memorandum on Federal Regulatory Management, 14 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 1883, 1905 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Harold H.
Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 548–49
(1989).
73 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 14.
74 Kagan, supra note 69, at 2276–77.
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duced dismay among the participants and, in some instances, consternation
among the regulators as well.”75 In the case of the Cotton Dust rule, Labor
Secretary Ray Marshall “objected to [the White House’s] interference,” but
ultimately acquiesced.76
Other critics pressed their objections further, in court. Arguing that the
EPA’s nonpublic deliberations with the White House and other executive
agencies violated the D.C. Circuit’s rules on ex parte communications,77 critics of the EPA’s final rule challenged the rule in court—only to receive from
the D.C. Circuit an emphatic endorsement of presidential oversight of the
rulemaking process. Construing the Clean Air Act’s transparency provisions
as not applying to “intra-executive contacts” (at least in matters not involving
agency adjudications or “quasi-adjudicatory proceedings”), Judge Wald’s
opinion for the court ranged far beyond mere questions of docketing executive officials’ ex parte communications with the agency. The court invoked
the President’s powers and duties as the Constitution’s exclusive recipient of
“the executive power” to undergird broader presidential authority over
agencies:
The court recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House
staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy. . . . The executive power under our Constitution, after all, is
not shared—it rests exclusively with the President. . . . To ensure the President’s control and supervision over the Executive Branch, the Constitution—
and its judicial gloss—vests him with the powers of appointment and
removal, the power to demand written opinions from executive officers, and
the right to invoke executive privilege to protect consultative privacy.78

The court further urged that presidential “control” of agencies’ rulemaking
is necessary to ensure the coherence of policy across agencies and the consistency of each agency’s policies with the broader policy judgments of the President himself:
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost, envi75 Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944–47 (1980).
76 Id. at 945.
77 See, e.g., Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168–70 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 468–78 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51–59 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
78 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also C. Boyden Gray, Presidential Involvement in Informal Rulemaking, 56
TUL. L. REV. 863, 867 (1982) (“Judge Wald’s opinion not only outlines the policy considerations justifying executive oversight of rulemaking activity, it also recognizes that the participation of the Executive Office of the President in resolving the policy issues presented in
rulemaking proceedings is not comparable to the participation of other groups outside the
agency. The President’s role is unique, both under our Constitution and as a matter of the
practical realities of governing an extremely complex society.”).
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ronmental, and energy considerations. They also have broad implications
for national economic policy. Our form of government simply could not
function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated
from each other and from the Chief Executive.79

The court’s opinion had ramifications well beyond just the EPA’s ozone
rule, or the Carter administration, for it helped to put wind in the sails of the
next administration’s efforts to impose still further presidential oversight on
the agencies’ rulemaking efforts. Two months before the court issued its
decision, the newly inaugurated President Reagan signed Executive Order
12291, further expanding and elaborating White House oversight of agencies’ rules.80 Most significantly, the order required executive agencies to analyze the likely costs and benefits of major rulemaking proposals, and to
submit those analyses to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review.81
But the order went beyond mere procedural requirements: Executive
Order 12291 required executive agencies, “to the extent permitted by law,”
to follow several substantive requirements.82 In any given rulemaking, they
were ordered to observe the following criteria, inter alia:
• “Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society;”
• “Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits
to society;” and
• “Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the
alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.”83
President Reagan’s order spurred no shortage of criticism,84 but as Paul
Verkuil observed a year later, the order seemed well rooted in Judge Wald’s
opinion for the D.C. Circuit: “It is fair to say,” Verkuil wrote, “that Sierra Club
is now the starting point for any discussion on the subject of White House
policymaking relations with executive agencies,” including President Reagan’s order.85
79 Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 406 (footnotes omitted).
80 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
81 Id. § 3.
82 Id. § 2.
83 Id. § 2(b)–(d).
84 See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 72; Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory
Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987); Morrison, supra note 69, at 1062–63;
Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and
Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627
(1989). But see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Peter M. Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight
and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
1235 (1981); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 201 (1986).
85 Paul Verkuil, Symposium on Presidential Control of Rulemaking: An Introduction, 56 TUL.
L. REV. 811, 815 (1982).
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Justice Kagan suggests that both the order itself and the OLC opinion
supporting the order stopped short of concluding that the President was genuinely “dictat[ing]” substantive agency decisions,86 but on their face both
documents did precisely that. As noted, the order established substantive
requirements that the agencies were bound to follow: “all agencies, to the
extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements.”87 The
caveat “to the extent permitted by law” conceded the President’s lack of
authority to direct agencies to disobey statutes, but short of statutory prohibitions the order expressly bound agencies on these substantive points. Thus,
Kenneth Culp Davis seemed on solid ground when he observed that Executive Order 12291 reflected the President’s assumption of “full power to control the content of rules issued by executive departments and agencies”—a
development that he welcomed, so long as the White House undertook its
control transparently.88
And while the OLC opinion conceded (as Justice Kagan notes) that
Executive Order 12291 did not empower the Director of the Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief to “displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions or in assessing and weighing the costs and
benefits of proposed actions,”89 OLC stressed throughout the opinion that
the agencies were bound to exercise their powers consistent with the President’s order, at least to the broadest possible extent not contradicting statutory commands:
The order does not empower the Director or the Task Force to displace the
relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions or in assessing and
weighing the costs and benefits of proposed actions. . . . [And it] leaves a
considerable amount of decisionmaking discretion to the agency. Under
the proposed order, the agency head, and not the President, would be
required to calculate potential costs and benefits and to determine whether
the benefits justify the costs. The agency would thus retain considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory action is justified and what form
such action should take.90

In short, and as reiterated at the end of OLC’s analysis, the agency
would still carry out its duties as originally specified by Congress—“the
agency head, and not the President, would be required to calculate potential
costs and benefits and to determine whether the benefits justify the costs”—
yet in carrying out those duties the agency would further be “required” to
86 Kagan, supra note 69, at 2278 (emphasis added).
87 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2.
88 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 849, 849
(1982).
89 Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 63
(1981). Justice Kagan indicates that this part of the OLC analysis pertained to the powers
of the President or the OMB Director, but in fact it was focused specifically on the Director
of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Compare Kagan, supra note 69, at 2278
n.126, with Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59 at
63–64.
90 Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. at 63.
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apply the additional standards imposed upon it by the President’s order.91
In other words, the President’s order simply narrowed the range of options
available to the agency under its statutes: “[I]t does not purport wholly to
displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress has allocated
to a particular subordinate official.”92
As political scientist Andrew Rudalevige observed in a recent pair of articles, the OIRA framework by which Presidents assert direct control of executive agencies and significantly affect their regulatory policies is now
entrenched, precisely because it arose not through a single fiat but through
the sustained efforts of many Presidents to assert and maintain that control.93
This process culminated with the election of President Clinton, who
reformed aspects of the OIRA framework but accepted and entrenched the
basic premise of presidential control.
Specifically, his Executive Order 12866 did not disturb the basic premise
that the President was exercising a power to direct executive agencies to exercise their statutory powers in specific ways, but rather he ratified his predecessors’ assertions of power, thus giving the OIRA framework a bipartisan
imprimatur. In fact, President Clinton’s order appeared to go farther than
the Reagan order, in that the order claimed authority for the President to
personally direct rulemaking outcomes when disputes arise among agencies
and OMB in the OIRA review process.94 The order’s inclusion of the nowfamiliar caveat, “to the extent permitted by law,” might have left some ambiguity in this assertion of presidential power, but Justice Kagan concludes that
“the fairly clear premise of the order was that the simple delegation of
rulemaking authority to a specified agency head (the kind of delegation
which underlies almost all regulations) would not prevent the President from
making a final decision.”95
D. Executive Power and Modern Administrative Law
The Presidents’ executive orders framing up the modern OIRA oversight process, and setting substantive standards for agencies’ application
within that framework, often operated within fault lines of modern administrative law, in terms of scholarly debates regarding the nature of presidential
power over agencies—in terms of both abstract theory and practical effect.
Specifically, President Reagan’s issuance of Executive Order 12291 and
his administration’s implementation of that order reinvigorated scholarly
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
93 See Rudalevige, supra note 69, at 106 (“Regulatory review did not instantly spring
into being when Reagan signed his executive order; it came about only after more than a
decade of effort prior to the Reagan administration, and it developed only because Reagan
and his team invested in its maturation. . . . And Reagan’s successors, of both parties, had
to buy into the process.”); see also Andrew Rudalevige, Beyond Structure and Process: The Early
Institutionalization of Regulatory Review (Working Paper, 2017) (on file with author).
94 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 569 (1994).
95 Kagan, supra note 69, at 2289.
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debate over the precise nature of powers delegated by Congress to the executive branch, and questions regarding the precise nature of presidential oversight and control of the executive branch. Critics of presidential
management of the rulemaking process objected that the President was
exceeding the limits of his office by attempting to control the agencies’ use
of powers that had been delegated by Congress to the agencies per se, not to
the President.
This criticism was presented well by Peter Strauss, who concludes that
“where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its
oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role—like that
of the Congress and the courts—is that of overseer and not decider.”96 This
criticism often recognizes that Congress may well choose to delegate power
specifically to the President,97 but in the absence of such an express delegation, “the President cannot simply command or direct an agency head to
issue a regulation.”98
But others replied that federal statutes were better read to support presidential control. Nina Mendelson argued that Congress’s mention of specific
executive officers cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of congressional
intent to prevent the President from directing the officers’ decisions, because
the broader legal context of administrative action gives a firm basis on which
to presume that “Congress is likely to expect potentially substantial presidential oversight of a wide range of executive branch agency actions,” and even
that “the backdrop and legislative context of simple delegations [of power to
executive agencies] . . . do not support the interpretation that [they] . . . are
meant to insulate the agency from the exercise of presidential directive
authority.”99 Justice Kagan, too, reviews constitutional law and history and
concludes that “a statutory delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing the President to assert directive authority, as
Clinton did, over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”100
Related to this debate was the parallel debate of “directive” authority
and “removal” power. The President unquestionably has power to remove
executive officers at will, at least in the absence of statutory provisions to the
contrary.101 But some scholars urge that this removal power does not imply
96 Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696, 704–05 (2007) (emphasis added); see also Peter L. Strauss, Presidential
Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984 (1997) (“[M]y conclusion is that the President is
simply in error and disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if rulemakings
were his rulemakings.”).
97 Percival, supra note 44, at 980–85; Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to
Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 293–96 (2006).
98 Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay
Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
99 Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency
Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2459, 2461 (2011).
100 Kagan, supra note 69, at 2251.
101 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926);
cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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an outright directive power over agency actions; a President wishing to prevail upon the decisions of an agency might secure his agency’s compliance
with explicit or implicit threats of firing the agency’s leadership, but, the
argument goes, in the end it remains the agency’s choice to make in light of
the removal threat.
Kenneth Culp Davis and others caution against placing too much weight
upon this distinction. Asking whether Reagan’s Executive Order 12291
effected a “transfer” of power from agencies to the President, Davis answers:
Technically no; in reality, yes. . . . The reality is, of course, that cabinet
officers may be removed from office at the will of the President . . . [and thus
a] request by the President or by his authorized representative that an
agency in an executive department make a change in a proposed or final
rule is likely to be honored.102

But even here Davis takes care to stress that he is talking about practical
fact, not legal effect: “the power is transferred [by Executive Order 12291,
from the agency to the President] only in fact, not in law.”103
But one of Davis’s predecessors, James Hart, drew a much more conclusive connection between the President’s express constitutional power to
remove officers and an implicit constitutional power to direct those officers.
Years before authoring the Brownlow Committee Report’s chapter on presidential management of agencies,104 Hart’s original study of presidential
power over administrative agencies argued that the President’s constitutional
powers, especially the removal power, furnish “him, within certain limits, not
only a practical, but also a legal, power of ‘administrative control’ over acts of
department heads which involve a choice.”105 Those “limits” were, by Hart’s
view, very broad—namely, judicial review to control “abuse of power, or
fraud, or excess of jurisdiction” and the like.106 “Within those limits,” Hart
concluded, “the fact that the law [that is, the Constitution] allows the President a method of control must be deemed to constitute a recognition of his
legal right to control.”107
II. JUDICIAL AFFIRMATION

OF

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL: SHERLEY V. SEBELIUS

The aforementioned OIRA framework orders, Executive Orders 12291
and 12866, were not the only efforts by Presidents Reagan and Clinton (and
later Presidents Bush Jr.108 and Obama109) to direct substantive judgments
by executive officers. As Justice Kagan observes, Presidents Reagan, Bush Sr.,
102 Davis, supra note 88, at 852–53 (citations omitted); see also Mendelson, supra note
99, at 2459.
103 Davis, supra note 88, at 853.
104 See BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 62.
105 JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 192 (1925) (emphasis added).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
109 Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009).
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and Clinton each issued substantive “directives” to their agencies in memoranda spelling out instructions on regulatory matters ranging from HIV to
education to water quality to food imports.110
President Obama continued this trend, issuing outright policy directives
on some of the most significant regulatory policy matters of his time, including climate regulation111 and perhaps net neutrality.112 But one of his policy
directives proved to be much more consequential in terms of giving rise to
judicial review of the ramifications of presidential directives in the rulemaking process: his executive order on embryonic stem cell research.
During the presidency of his predecessor, George W. Bush, the issue of
embryonic stem cell research sparked substantial controversy.113 Bush’s policy reflected his effort not just to thread the needle of exceptionally difficult
judgments of values, morals, and ethics, but also his effort to abide the limits
of an annual appropriations rider, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which
prohibits federal funds from being used for “research in which a human
embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk
of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in
utero.”114
As a candidate for the presidency, then-Senator Obama criticized President Bush’s policy. Not long after his own inauguration, President Obama
directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to immediately change course on stemcell research policy.115 President Obama directed NIH to review existing gui110 Kagan, supra note 69, at 2294–95.
111 See, e.g., Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum—Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, WHITE HOUSE (June 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards
(“To ensure continued progress in reducing harmful carbon pollution, I direct you to use
your authority under sections 111(b) and 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to issue standards,
regulations, or guidelines, as appropriate, that address carbon pollution from modified,
reconstructed, and existing power plants and build on State efforts to move toward a
cleaner power sector.”).
112 The record is much less clear as to whether President Obama actually directed FCC
Commissioners to enact his preferred policy, or whether he simply created a political environment to which Commissioners were susceptible to influence. In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5921 (2015) (Comm’r Pai, dissenting) (“So
why is the FCC changing course? Why is the FCC turning its back on Internet freedom? Is
it because we now have evidence that the Internet is not open? No. Is it because we have
discovered some problem with our prior interpretation of the law? No. We are flip-flopping for one reason and one reason alone. President Obama told us to do so.”).
113 See generally ADAM BRIGGLE, A RICH BIOETHICS: PUBLIC POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
THE KASS COUNCIL (2010) (discussing the controversial council on bioethics established by
President Bush).
114 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. 803
(emphasis added); see also Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,591 (June 20, 2007).
For an account of President Bush’s decision, see The Stem Cell Debates: Lessons for Science and
Politics, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2012, at 14–34.
115 Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
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dance on the funding of embryonic stem-cell research, and to “issue new
NIH guidance on such research that is consistent with this order.”116 And at
the outset of his order, President Obama announced that “[t]he purpose of
this order is,” inter alia, “to remove these limitations on scientific inquiry, to
expand NIH support for the exploration of human stem cell research.”117
Pursuant to those orders, NIH and HHS issued new guidance,
expanding funding for embryonic stem cell research.118 In the course of
those proceedings, commenters challenged the new policy of expanding
funding for embryonic stem-cell research and urged the agencies to take the
opposite course—to not expand stem-cell research, but instead to limit or
end it.119
The agencies declined to respond to these comments, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the agencies’ silence. While agencies are generally required
under the APA to respond to comments,120 the court explained, that duty is
not absolute. And, the court held, that duty does not apply in cases where
the agency is effectuating an otherwise lawful executive order: “Following
these commenters’ lead would directly oppose the clear import of the Executive Order, which sought to remove limitations on [embryonic stem-cell
research] and to expand NIH [funding] for stem-cell research,” the court
observed, and “NIH may not simply disregard an Executive Order. To the
contrary, as an agency under the direction of the executive branch, it must
implement the President’s policy directives to the extent permitted by
law.”121
In short, the agency was “[b]ound” to implement the President’s
order.122 And thus, because the agencies’ formulation of guidance was from
the outset bound by the President’s directive to expand funding, any comments urging the opposite policy “simply did not address any factor relevant
to implementing the Executive Order.”123
III. WHEN EXECUTIVE ORDERS “TRUMP” THE AGENCY’S DUTY
TO COMMENTS

TO

RESPOND

Was the D.C. Circuit correct? Does a President’s executive order
directing an agency to pursue a policy “trump” the agency’s obligation under
the courts’ APA precedents to vet a policy’s merits through the notice-and116 Id. § 3.
117 Id. § 1.
118 See 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170 (July 7, 2009).
119 See Brief for Appellants at 45, Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No.
11-5241), 2012 WL 111650, at *45 (“The 30,000 comments questioning the scientific and
ethical merits of human embryonic stem-cell research were directly relevant to the issues
before the agency.”).
120 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
121 Sherley, 689 F.3d at 784.
122 Id. at 785.
123 Id.
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comment process? What is the proper relationship between executive orders
and the APA?
While executive orders have long given rise to litigation, including litigation related to regulatory issues, the courts have had little to say about the
precise relationship between executive orders and the APA.124 And, as noted
above, the APA’s own legislative history is silent on the subject.125 But when
the issue is defined very carefully, the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Sherley seems
not only cogent but also consistent with the basic premises of the APA.
Again, to answer this question carefully requires reiteration of some basic
limits and parameters to the inquiry. A President’s executive order is unlawful if it violates the Constitution.126 A President’s executive order is also
unlawful if it violates a federal statute, so long as the federal statute is itself
lawful.127 Similarly, an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious, and thus
unlawful, if it violates or ignores the statutory criteria established by Congress
to guide it.128 On the other hand, agencies retain broad discretion to select
the criteria or tools that they will use to make a final decision as to how to
exercise discretion within the broad limits set by Congress.129
So if a President issues an executive order pointing an agency in a particular policy direction, but the substance of his preferred policy violates the
limits imposed by Congress’s lawful statutes empowering that agency in the
first place, then the executive order cannot stand.130 Or if the President
orders an agency to adopt a policy regardless of substantive criteria set by
Congress in the statute empowering the agency, then the order cannot
stand.131 Indeed, those are the limits that the OLC highlighted and conceded in its original opinion supporting President Reagan’s Executive Order
12291:
124 See Erica Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026 (2015); Steven
Ostrow, Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659 (1987).
125 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–95 (2006).
127 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); see also
Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Of course, an executive order cannot
supersede a statute.”).
128 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
129 See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1603–07 (2014)
(affirming the EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis to allocate pollution-reduction burdens
among states, amid Congress’s silence on the subject).
130 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (“Under the clear terms of the
Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse
gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as
to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. To the
extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator
or the President, this is the congressional design.” (citation omitted)).
131 Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 471 & n.4 (2001) (holding
that the Clean Air Act bars the EPA from considering costs—even in secret—when setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL408.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 23

31-MAY-18

executive orders and policymaking discretion

9:16

1591

[I]t is clear that the President’s exercise of supervisory powers must conform
to legislation enacted by Congress. In issuing directives to govern the Executive Branch, the President may not, as a general proposition, require or permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress.132

But when a President’s order directs an agency to adopt a policy that fits
within the broad limits of the substantive statute, must the agency still
respond to rulemaking comments criticizing the President’s policy choice?
The correct answer seems to be the one given by the D.C. Circuit—namely,
no. This reflects both the limited nature of the agencies’ court-made duties
to respond to comments, but also courts’ appreciation of executive orders as
genuinely binding legal commands.
A. Agencies’ Duty to Respond Is Limited and Lenient
The APA does not expressly require agencies, in formulating a final rule,
to respond to comments on the original notice of proposed rulemaking.
Rather, that requirement is one that has been formulated by the courts in
order to elaborate and give effectual meaning to the APA’s broadly worded
requirements: “Notice and comment rulemaking procedures obligate the
[agency] to respond to all significant comments, for ‘the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to significant points raised
by the public.’ ”133
But as a court-made elaboration of the APA, an agency’s duty to respond
to comments is “not ‘particularly demanding’ ”; it is governed by the arbitrary
and capricious standard.134 An agency need not reply to literally “every comment made”;135 rather, “[t]he failure to respond to comments is significant
only insofar as it demonstrates that the agency’s decision was not ‘based on a
consideration of the relevant factors.’ ”136
B. Executive Orders Are Binding Commands that May Have Collateral
Consequences
Those lenient standards defining agencies’ duties to respond create the
space not just for agency action, but also for agency action pursuant to a
132 Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 61
(1981) (footnote omitted).
133 ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Ala.
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
134 Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); ACLU, 823 F.2d at
1581.
135 Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
136 Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)); see Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC,
450 F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 257–58
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam); cf. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1368 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (“It would be a different matter if the President directed the agency, in the
course of its inquiry, to disregard the statutory criteria controlling its actions.”).
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presidential directive. For as the D.C. Circuit observed in Sherley, if a President squarely ordered the agency to take action within the lawful limits of the
statutes and Constitution, and if executive orders truly are binding as a matter of law, then the agencies genuinely do not have the power to disregard
the order.137 That is, if Alexander Hamilton was correct that executive
officers, “to whose immediate management [domestic policies] are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate . . . and ought to be subject to his superintendence,”138 then the officers
truly are, in the D.C. Circuit’s words, “duty-bound to give effect to the policies embodied in the President’s direction, to the extent allowed by the
law.”139
Critics of this position effectively challenge the authority of executive
orders as lawfully binding. This is a distinction that the D.C. Circuit drew in
Allbaugh, observing the substantive difference between executive orders—
that is, presidential directives requiring an agency to adopt a position—and
other executive communications simply requesting that an agency take action,
or requiring an agency to adopt a position “[t]o the extent permitted by
law.”140 When the President orders action within the statutes’ lawful limits,
there is “nothing arbitrary in the decision of the officials involved not to go
their own separate ways in light of the President’s directive . . . . Within the
range of choice allowed by statute, the President may direct his subordinates’
choices.”141
The Supreme Court has often recognized that executive orders are binding, supreme law so long as they comport with statutory and constitutional
limits. A useful example can be found in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, where
the Supreme Court held that labor disputes between federal employers and
federal employees were controlled (at that time) by President Nixon’s Executive Order 11491.142 The Court held that the executive order was “a reasonable exercise of the President’s responsibility for the efficient operation of the
Executive Branch,” not inconsistent with statutes; accordingly, the Court further concluded, “we have no difficulty concluding that the Executive Order is
valid and may create rights protected against inconsistent state laws through
the Supremacy Clause.”143
Indeed, if executive orders are in fact legally binding, as suggested by
the historical experience outlined at the outset of this Article, then agencies
would lack any power or discretion to second guess the President’s judgment.
Agencies are not obliged to respond to questions challenging the constitu137 Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
139 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see
Sherley, 689 F.3d at 784.
140 Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Brown, 645 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote
omitted).
142 Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974).
143 Id. at 273 n.5.
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tionality of the statutes that mandate their action,144 because they cannot
resolve squarely presented constitutional issues.145 If executive orders are
superior law, just as statutes are superior law, then agencies cannot challenge
their lawfulness in the course of a rulemaking.
But this does impose upon the agencies and courts a duty to discern
whether an executive order genuinely is an executive order. As noted above,
not all presidential instructions are orders. Indeed, not all executive orders
are truly orders—some merely request that agencies take action.146 Only
once it is clear that the President has ordered an agency to take action can an
agency be bound. And similarly, the agency and the court must be precise in
defining precisely what the President has ordered. In Sherley, the agencies’
and court’s work was made easier by the fact that commenters were clearly
challenging the President’s order: he had ordered the agencies to increase
stem cell research funding, while the commenters wanted the agencies to
decrease or eliminate such funding.147 Had the commenters merely asked
the agency to increase funding only by a small amount, then the President’s
order would not have dictated the agency’s outcome.
In that respect, Sherley seems to echo decisions by the Supreme Court
and D.C. Circuit recognizing the ramifications of executive orders that substantively tie agencies’ hands.
The most immediate analogy would be to the OIRA context itself. As
noted above, the executive orders creating the centralized White House regulatory review process included not just procedural commands, but also substantive ones. And the D.C. Circuit long ago gave effect to those commands
by treating them as binding. Not long after President Reagan issued Executive Order 12291, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an agency’s decision to consider
the economic costs of a new rule, precisely because “Executive Orders specifically require an agency to evaluate the economic impact of its regulations.”148
Years later, in the D.C. Circuit’s seminal cost-benefit decision arising from
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s lockout/tagout rule,
the court observed that the agency “ha[d] an existing obligation under
[Executive Order 12291] to complete a cost-benefit analysis for each major
rulemaking.”149
Another analogous precedent is found in the context of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA normally obliges an agency to con144 See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Graceba Total
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 115 F.3d 1038, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
145 See Am. Coal. for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761, 766 & n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
146 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2011) (requesting that independent
agencies review their regulations).
147 Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 779–80 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
148 Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1222 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978)).
149 Int’l Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
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sider the environmental impacts of its actions, much like the APA (as elaborated by the courts) normally requires agencies to respond to comments.150
But, the Supreme Court has held, in Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, that when an agency implements a policy decision made by the President, it is not required to analyze the environmental impacts of the President’s decision, because it has no control over the President.151 In that case,
the Court was considering the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s
actions implementing the President’s decision to allow Mexican motor carriers to drive on U.S. highways.152 Because the President made that decision
(through a presidential memorandum published in the Federal Register),153
the Court held that the agency was not obligated to justify the environmental
impacts of that policy through the normal NEPA analysis requirement. After
all, the Court observed:
It would not . . . satisfy NEPA’s “rule of reason” to require an agency to
prepare a full EIS due to the environmental impact of an action it could not
refuse to perform. Put another way, the legally relevant cause of the entry of
the Mexican trucks is not FMCSA’s action, but instead the actions of the
President in lifting the moratorium and those of Congress in granting the
President this authority while simultaneously limiting FMCSA’s
discretion.154

In other words, the agency would not be held accountable for the President’s action. The President’s binding decision would recalibrate the
agency’s other procedural duties—not vice versa. This is the same basic premise and principle that the D.C. Circuit advanced in Sherley.
C. Presidential Control Is the Premise of Modern Administrative Law’s Most
Significant Doctrine
Finally, taking a step back from the specific issue of executive orders per
se, one sees that the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Sherley fits squarely with the
tenor of the Supreme Court’s efforts to place presidential power and
accountability at the heart of administrative law through the Chevron
doctrine.
In Chevron, the Court justified judicial deference to agencies’ statutory
interpretations primarily in terms of the President’s political accountability.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
150 See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 551 (1978) (describing the duties imposed by NEPA).
151 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 765–70 (2004).
152 Id. at 756.
153 67 Fed. Reg. 71,795 (Dec. 2, 2002).
154 Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 769.
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resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light
of everyday realities.155
While agreeing that ultimately the agency resolves the policy issue
through regulatory actions, Chevron’s focus on the President as the locus of
responsibility for everyday regulatory decisions would imply that the President ultimately controls agency action; the Court did not seem to imply that
Chevron was premised upon Presidents commonly firing or threatening to
fire executive officers in order to align the agencies with their views.
The Court returned to this premise in later cases reaffirming the broad
scope of Chevron. In City of Arlington, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
stressed in a footnote that rulemakings “are exercises of—indeed, under our
constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power,’ ”
which is vested in the President alone.156 Similarly, in Brand X, the Court
stressed that “the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided
by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency,”157 in order to
preserve the agency’s ability to “ ‘consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis’ . . . in response to changed factual
circumstances, or a change in administrations.”158
On this latter point, the Court in Brand X invoked then-Justice Rehnquist’s separate opinion in State Farm, where he stressed that the President’s
policy views can be a paramount consideration:
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a different political party. . . . A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within
the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative
records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the
administration.159
Which is to say, the philosophy of the President.160
155 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
156 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305 n.4 (2013) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1).
157 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
158 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64).
159 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
160 Then-Justice Rehnquist was not alone in recognizing the importance of presidential
power, and presidential accountability through elections, as a fundamental premise of
modern administrative law. Other Justices have reiterated the importance of presidential
control of at least executive agencies in formulating administration policy. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Fox, where he attempts to distinguish independent agencies from executive agencies, expressly presumes that executive agencies are simply “an arm or an eye of the
executive,” and that executive agencies’ policies are “subject to change at the President’s
will.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 540 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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Chevron deference exemplifies modern administrative law’s appreciation
of the President’s central role, power, and responsibility in the context of
administrative policymaking. Indeed, much (but not all) of Chevron’s legitimacy is premised upon the President’s power over the agencies, which are in
turn treated as Chief Justice Taft saw them in Myers:
The highest and most important duties which his subordinates perform are
those in which they act for him. In such cases they are exercising not their
own but his discretion . . . .
In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the President
in determining the national public interest and in directing the action to be
taken by his executive subordinates to protect it. In this field his cabinet
officers must do his will.161

The D.C. Circuit’s approach in Sherley echoes that fundamental premise
of presidential control and accountability, in the context of agency policymaking through rulemaking.162
IV. HIGHER TRANSPARENCY: REDIRECTING ACCOUNTABILITY
PRESIDENT HIMSELF

TO THE

Again, none of the foregoing is intended to suggest that the agency is
not obligated to at least explain why it is bound by the order, just as it must
explain why a statute dictates its outcome. And this, in turn, directs public
scrutiny to where it properly belongs: to the President himself.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 628 (1935)). In that same case, Justice Breyer’s similar efforts to contrast the independent FCC with executive agencies conceded that the latter may much more legitimately
base their actions on “purely political reasons” or “unexplained policy preferences,”
because executive agencies, unlike independent agencies, are “directly responsible to the
[people].” Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). More recently, the D.C. Circuit’s Chief Judge
Merrick Garland acknowledged then-Justice Rehnquist’s point, quoting his State Farm point
at length in an opinion affirming a significant change in environmental policy brought
about by “the inauguration of a new President and the confirmation of a new EPA Administrator.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
161 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132–34 (1926) (citations omitted).
162 Of course, by focusing on policymaking through rulemaking, this Article sidesteps
complications presented by other aspects of the rulemaking process. For example, would a
President’s directives regarding factual findings, rather than policy discretion, be entitled
to the same judicial deference? Likely not, for the reasons highlighted by State Farm itself,
which struck down an agency’s action repealing a prior airbag regulation without addressing its prior factual findings. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (holding that an agency’s change in
regulation may be subject to heightened scrutiny if “its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy”); see also id. at 538 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Or, to step beyond the rulemaking
context, could a President use an executive order to dictate a policy in the context of an
agency adjudication? Even Chief Justice Taft, in Myers, expressed doubts. See Myers, 272
U.S. at 135 (“[T]here may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive
officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests
of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly
influence or control.”).
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To the extent that affected parties seek to challenge the lawfulness of
the President’s order, judicial review can be found, if at all, in direct judicial
review of the order itself. This route presents challenges—especially jurisdictional ones—but it has the salutary effect of promoting transparency, because
it traces accountability for the President’s actions to the President himself.
And thus the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Sherley epitomizes the Hamiltonian
presidency, an office that for the sake of good government must be both
energetic and accountable.163

163

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
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